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ASSESSING THE SOVIET NAVAL BUILD-UP
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
THREATS TO REGIONAL SECURITY*
The United States has focussed on two fundamental trends in the Asia-
Pacific region as matters of deep concern: (i) the adverse balance of trade,
particularly, but not exclusively, with Japan; and, (ii) the enduring Soviet
and Soviet-client military buildup in the region. While the American
response to the first trend has been largely reactive, the second trend of a
growing Soviet military-especially Soviet naval-presence has stimulated
vigorous U.S. activity.
Indeed, the American response to the persistent and accelerating
strengthening of Soviet military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region can be
seen both in the changing configuration of the Seventh Fleet and, perhaps
more surprisingly, in the recognition among U.S. naval planners that naval
strategy per se was in need of revision. Ironically, as the Soviet Union
developed a formidable modem blue-water navy able to challenge the
integrity of the U.S. and its friends' interests worldwide, U.S. naval
strategists adopted the ancient dictum of the first great theorist of conflict,
Sun Zi (Sun Tzu)-they began studying war.
Consequently, naval defense planners in the United States have
recently emerged from the most fundamental re-examination of American
military strategy and force-posture in more than 30 years. The result of this
intense introspection is the naval counterpart to the Strategic Defense
L I would like to thank the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's Research Council for
its support in preparation of this paper. The views expressed are the author's and do not
represent the position of the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Government.
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Initiative, that is, "the Maritime Strategy."2 This strategy emphasizes "early,
forceful, global forward deployment of maritime power to deter war with the
Soviet Union and to achieve U.S. war aims should deterrence fail,"3 and has
been referred to as "the major change" made by the Reagan administration in
U.S. defense planning. 4
Although aimed at deterring Soviet global aggression, the Maritime
Strategy is also a frank recognition of the critical military, economic and
social importance of the Asia-Pacific region for the United States. First,
militarily, the Maritime Strategy confirms that U.S. global strategists have
now abandoned the "swing strategy" of the 1970s which would have drained
U.S. forces in Asia to bolster European defenses.5 . Second, the Strategy
implicitly acknowledges America's vital economic links to the Asia-Pacific.
Although the economic trends detailing the region's remarkable resurgence
2
- In a special Supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings of the United States
Naval Institute, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, jointly authorized The Maritime Strategy.
3
- Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security," International Security,
Vol. II, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 58-88.
4
- Jack Beatty, "In Harm's Way," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1987, p. 37. Similar
to the SDI, the Maritime Strategy has generated debate between proponents and
opponents. Brooks is representative of those who support the Maritime Strategy; Colin
Gray, "The Maritime Strategy," US Naval Institute, Proceedings, February 1986 also
argues in favor of the Maritime Strategy albeit with some modifications. Beatty is highly
critical of the Strategy as are several other civilian analysts. See for example, John J.
Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Mis-step: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,"
International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3-57; Keith A. Dunn and William
O. Staudenmaier, "Strategy for Survival," Foreign Policy, No. 52 (Fall 1983), pp. 22-41;
Jeffrey Record, "Jousting with Unreality," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter
1983-84) pp. 3-18; Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60 (Summer 1982) pp. 1 124-1 144; and, Joshua M. Epstein,
"Horizontal Escalation," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983-84) pp. 17-31.
5
- The "swing strategy," entailed not only drawing down military resources from the
Pacific to defend Europe first, but also most of the Navy and Marine Corps resources put
into the R.D.F. for Southwest Asia were taken from US forces in the Pacific.
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are well known, it is worth emphasizing that the Asia-Pacific region will
soon provide 25 per cent of gross world output; Japan's GNP is rivalling
Soviet GNP; China's GNP may well equal current Soviet GNP in as few as
15 years; and from 1973 to 1984 U.S. trade with East Asia increased from
US$42 billion to US$170 billion. As former Secretary of Defense
Weinberger noted, 35 per cent of U.S. trade is conducted with the Asia-
Pacific region. 6 In economic terms, for over a dozen years the region has
been more important to the U.S. than has Europe-an importance which must
increase as China modernizes. Third, deepening personal relations in terms
of immigration, social and family ties between the U.S. and countries in the
region both reinforce and add new dimensions to the mosaic characterizing
Asian-American relations.
It is this strengthening nexus of trans-Pacific linkages-not necessarily
shared global threat perceptions—which may provide a basis for mutual
security concerns between the U.S. and regional actors. Nevertheless, while
U.S. economic decision-makers have long recognized the profound
significance of a shift to the "Pacific century," it was the ongoing
strengthening of Soviet military forces that galvanized U.S. security
strategists into examining security assumptions in the Pacific.
This paper attempts to place the Maritime Strategy in the context of
security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in Southeast Asia.
First, one of the catalysts for the Maritime Strategy—the Soviet naval
buildup in the Pacific—is examined; second, several key issues arising from
6
- Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress,
Fiscal Year 1987 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1986) p. 276.
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the Soviet naval buildup for Sino-U.S. naval relations are addressed; finally,
this paper details the implications of the Soviet naval buildup in Southeast
Asia for Sino-U.S.-ASEAN security concerns.
I. The Soviet Naval Buildup in the Pacific
While the Maritime Strategy is based on specific assumptions
concerning Soviet military intentions and Soviet global war scenarios,
defense planners must prepare to cope with actual Soviet capabilities,
measured by military hardware. Here, the record from the mid-1960s has
been one of a substantial and continuous strengthening of Soviet naval
capability in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the area has historically been
of military concern to the Soviet Union, it has been placed second, after
Europe, as a theater of war. Several analysts now view the massive and
accelerating pace of Soviet military modernization in the Asia-Pacific area as
clarifying the extent to which Soviet strategic planners see policies in the Far
East and in Europe interactively. 7 It is now abundantly evident that
Moscow's goal is to firmly establish the Soviet Union as both a European
and an Asian power.
Table 1 illustrates the dramatic change in the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
From a coastal defense force, the Pacific Fleet has become a superpower-
class blue-water navy capable of projecting power in order to complete
(among other tasks) the encirclement of Asia. Overall, the Soviet Pacific
7
- See for example, Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Motives
and Prospects," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds. The Soviet Far East
Military Buildup (Dover, MA: Auburn House, 1986) pp. 40-55.
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Table 1: Soviet Pacific Fleet Strength in Relation to Total
Soviet Navv
Total
North Baltic Black Pacific Soviet
Sea Sea Sea Fleet Navy
Surface Combatants
Helicopter Carriers 1 2 3
Cruisers 10 4 9 15 38
Destroyers 17 13 19 14 63
Frigates 46 28 51 54 179
Total surface combatants 74 45 79 85 283
Submarines
Strategic 40 6 1 32 79
Attack 140 39 34 83 296
Total submarines 180 45 35 115 375
Amphibious 13 20 24 20 77
Amphibious warfare 5 30 35 30 100
Underway
replenishment 25 10 20 25 80
Other support ships 70 35 50 65 220
Other (mine warfare,
intelligence, auxiliaries 5
patrol craft) 220 400 345 475 1,440
Grand total 587 585 588 815 2,575
Naval Aircraft
Tactical 100 115 95 180 490
Tactical support - - - - 75
Reconn/EW 80 55 45 90 270
Antisubmarine
warfare 160 45 100 175 480
Utility 85 45 210 65 405
Total Aircraft 425 260 450 510 1,720
Personnel 126,000 87,000 101,000 159,000 473,000
Source: U.S. Defense Department Estimates. Also see, Benjamin F. Schemmer, "The
Pacific Naval Balance," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1984; and
Anthony Preston, "The Changing Balance in the Pacific," Jane's Defense
Weekly, September 20, 1984.
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naval presence has increased 70 percent since the mid-1960s. The Soviet
Union had about 50 surface combatants in the Asia Pacific region then;
today there are 85. The Pacific Fleet itself is the largest of the Soviets' four
fleets. With 815 ships, submarines, support vessels, patrol craft and landing
craft, it comprises nearly one-third of the Soviet Navy, nearly one-third of all
Soviet submarines, over 40 percent of all Soviet strategic submarines and
one-third of Soviet naval manpower.
Some of the best ships available to the Soviet Navy have been
assigned to the Pacific Fleet. It has two of the Soviet Navy's three
operational Kiev aircraft carriers, one of the Navy's two Ivan Rogov large
amphibious ships, one-half of the Soviet Union's Delta III ballistic missile
submarines, one-half of the Soviet Fleet's Yankee-class submarines and it is
now also equipped with Victor III attack submarines.
In other words, the Pacific Fleet is a balanced naval force that includes
substantive strategic, strike, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare
capability. There does not appear to be any slackening in the modernization
of this Fleet. For example, since November 1985 three new principal surface
combatants were transferred to the Pacific: a Kiev-class nuclear-powered
guided-missile cruiser, a Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyer and a
Udoloy-class guided-missile destroyer. These ships are the first of their
classes to be assigned to the Pacific. 8
It is expected that the quality and capability of Soviet naval and naval
air forces in the Asia Pacific will continue to improve with the introduction
8
- Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, March 1987), pp. 68-69.
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of new naval assets. The Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine has
now been launched as well as additional Kilo-class diesel-powered attack
submarines. Both submarines are expected to join the Pacific Fleet.
Additionally, the Helix B, a sea-based combat helicopter, has entered Soviet
Naval Aviation and could be used with Soviet Naval Infantry units (Marines)
in the Pacific Fleet. Given the air-assault and fire-support features of the
Helix B, its introduction to the Pacific has markedly improved Soviet
capabilities for conducting amphibious operations in the region.
Although not specifically examined in this paper, Soviet air and
ground forces have similarly undergone substantial modernization and
expansion. For example, there are now about 500,000 Soviet troops in the
Far East and newer aircraft are being sent to the over 40 tactical air
regiments in the region. These will complement the 80 Backfire bombers
based in the Asian Theater, with the Backfires capable of striking targets
throughout the Pacific with either nuclear or conventional weapons.9
Not only has the number and quality of Soviet naval assets in the
Pacific Fleet undergone a substantial expansion, the nature of operations has
changed. Soviet exercises now integrate the Soviet air arm with naval
activities in increasingly sophisticated exercises.
9
- The Soviet Air Force has deployed over 40 supersonic strategic Backfire bombers
in the Far East since 1978 while more than 30 Soviet naval aviation Backfires which
carry AS-4 long-range anti-ship missiles, have been deployed at Alekseyevka since 1980.
The Backfires can operate against sea-lanes as far away as Midway, Guam, and the
Philippines, and return to their base along the Soviet east coast, without refuelling. In
total, the Soviet Pacific Fleet Air Force now includes over 90 Backfire and Badger
aircraft armed with cruise missiles.
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Several observers 10 point out that the size of Soviet forces in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans does not yet compensate for the superior quality
of U.S. Naval forces (See Table 2).
















West East Total U.S
Pacific Pacific Pacific




























Deployment locations of three U.S. SSBNs is classified.
Sources: For Soviet Pacific Fleet, see Table 1.
For U.S. Pacific Fleet, See Alvin H. Bernstein, "The Soviets in Cam Ranh
Bay," The National Interest, Spring 1986
However, the Soviet Union also focuses on countries other than the
U.S., for example, China. In this respect, Soviet Pacific forces remain well
10
- See for example, Alvin H. Bernstein, "The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay," The
National Interest, No. 3 (Spring 1986), p. 20.
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ahead of China's navy (See Table 3 below) and of course, well ahead of any
of the much smaller ASEAN navies. 11
Geo-politically, the entire Soviet position in Siberia and in the Pacific
is flanked on land by China and generally offshore by the U.S. with its sea
and air power in bases in Japan (including Okinawa) and in the Philippines.
As is well-known, the Soviet Pacific Fleet must pass through the Soya Strait
(between Hokkaido and Sakhalin), the Tsugaru Strait (between Hokkaido
and Honshu) or the Tsushima Strait (between Honshu and Korea). Passage
through the Soya brings Soviet naval power into the Sea of Okhotsk from
which it would need to pass between the Kuril Islands in order to reach open
sea. Since Soya freezes over during the winter, the Soviet fleet must, in
reality, rely on the Tsugaru Strait. Although the major and growing Soviet
Naval base on the Kamchatka peninsula at Petropavlovsk has unrestricted
access to the Pacific, Petropavlovsk has the double disadvantage of ice for
several months of the year and acute isolation. It is more than 1000 miles
from the nearest railhead. 12
The difficulty of operating through the choke-points in Northeast Asia
helps to explain the determination of the Soviet Union in effecting a
successful "geo-strategic leapfrog" 13 by establishing a major base complex at
1L For a concise assessment of ASEAN naval forces see the annual review (March
issue) of "Far Eastern Navies" in US Naval Institute, Proceedings,. For a relatively recent
qualitative assessment, also see, Bradley Hahn, "Southeast Asia's Miniature Naval Arms
Race," Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1985, pp. 21-24. The best-known data-
source on world navies is Jane's Fighting Ships, (London: Janes).
12
- Colin S. Gray, "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implication for NATO,
Naval War College Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1987), p. 12.
13
- Gray, "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific," p. 12.
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Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. It is this Soviet military presence in Vietnam,
and Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, which has
sharpened U.S. concerns about Soviet objectives in the Asia-Pacific region,
particularly in Southeast Asia.
Indeed Cam Ranh Bay is the largest Soviet naval deployment base
outside the USSR. 14 The dramatic and inexorable increase in Soviet naval
presence in Southeast Asia made possible by the acquisition of this base is
apparent when it is recalled that prior to 1979, the Soviet Navy operated only
occasionally in the area. From an initial five to eight ships in 1979, Cam
Ranh Bay is today base for 25 to 30 Soviet naval ships which now routinely
patrol the South China Sea. For the first time this deployment includes the
stationing of Soviet attack submarines in this region; specifically, Charlie-,
Echo- and Kilo-class submarines, as well as Kashei-class destroyers and
Nanuchka-class guided-missile patrol combatants, are among the Soviet
ships supported by the naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. From the 8500-ton
floating dry dock (a dry dock capable of servicing a Soviet cruiser) and two
floating piers put in place in 1982, the Soviet commitment to maintaining
Cam Ranh Bay has been further demonstrated by the recent completion of a
seventh pier. Unlike other Third World bases where the Soviets have
historically favored mostly movable or "removable" assets, U.S. defense
planners have recently concluded that the Soviet Union is now constructing
permanent facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, indicating a highly significant change
in Soviet basing policy. 15
14
- Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, April 1988) p. 124.
15
- Soviet Military Power 1988, p. 139.
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1
One of the most remarkable developments in this buildup occurred in
November 1983, when the Soviet Union stationed nuclear-capable attack-
bombers in Vietnam. This seems to have been the first time since 1971 that
Soviet-manned bombers have been deployed to bases outside areas
contiguous to the Soviet bloc. Currently, 16 Badger bombers are stationed at
this installation, with 10 being strike variance capable of carrying anti-ship
cruise missiles. Today, the composite naval air unit at Cam Ranh also
includes, in addition to the Badger strike-aircraft, Bear D Reconnaissance
and Bear F anti-submarine aircraft and MIG-23/Flogger fighters. 16 The
Badger bombers give the Soviet Union a regional strike capability over all
the ASEAN states, Southern China and possibly as far east as the U.S.
territory of Guam and the western part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, while the MIG 23/Flogger fighters provide air defense and strike
escort for the Badgers in their regional operations. Although opinion is
divided on the threat this new offensive capability may ultimately pose to
U.S. naval operations and facilities in the region, the Soviet deployment of
bombers to Vietnam sets a precedent and thus a new level for future Soviet
military deployment to Cam Ranh, perhaps to include the stationing of
Backfire bombers.
The strengthening of Soviet strategic attack and ocean-going
capabilities in Southeast Asia is further underlined by expanding Soviet
facilities in Northeast Asia (principally Vladivostock, Petropavlovsk and the
small port in Korsakor, astride Soya, which is being "transformed into a
16
- Soviet Military Power 1988, p. 28.
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major naval base"). 17 In this respect, the marked improvement in Soviet-
North Korean military relations since 1984 takes on added salience. 18 While
some analysts tend to dismiss the appeal of North Korean ports to Soviet
naval strategists or the appeal to North Korea of Soviet access to Korean
bases, 19 airspace over North Korea is surely another matter. Indeed a
significant consequence of improving Soviet-North Korean relations has
been the expansion in Soviet intelligence overflights of North Korea that,
until 1968, had been strictly limited to southbound flights. Soviet strike-
aircraft based at Cam Ranh Bay are now also permitted to overfly North
Korea on their northward flights to the Soviet Union. During these two-way
flights, Soviet bombers conduct simulated missile strikes as well as
reconnaissance against U.S. and South Korean forces, Okinawa, Japan and
Chinese naval facilities. It is reported that North Korea, in return, has begun
receiving forty-six MIG-23/Flogger fighters as well as SA-3 surface-to-air
missiles. In 1987, the Soviet Union apparently provided Pyongyang with
two new items, the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and long-range
SA-5 surface-to-air missiles. 20
11 Donald G. Daniel and Gael D. Tarleton, "The US Navy in the Western Pacific,"
Asia Pacific Community, No. 31 (Winter 1986), pp. 123-124.
18
- In 1984, a Soviet military manual described the North Korean east coast port of
Najia as "fully integrated into the Soviet [military] system." Soviet docking and
refuelling rights on North Korea's west coast "would allow the Soviet Pacific Fleet to
outflank the Japan Straits and frustrate [efforts by the US and Japan] to bottle it up in the
Sea of Japan." Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1986. Since 1985 the Soviet Navy has made
a number of symbolic port visits to Wonson, North Korea and there have been combined
North Korean-Soviet naval exercises in 1986, 1987 and 1988.
19
- Edward Olsen, "Keeping North Korea Out of Soviet Hands," Far Eastern
Economic Review, May 14, 1987.
20
- Soviet Military Power 1988, p. 136.
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The Soviet military buildup in the South China Sea underlines the
increasing reach of Soviet military power and the potential political
influence of the Soviet Union on regional issues. Indeed, the enormous
benefits associated with the "geo-strategic leapfrog" from frozen northern
bases to Vietnam are perhaps indicated by the financial cost; since 1978
Soviet military aid to Vietnam has totalled over US$9 billion, a military aid
program supported by 2500 Soviet military advisers stationed in-country.
Additionally, more than US$8 billion in Soviet economic assistance has been
provided to Vietnam during the period 1978-85. In 1986, Moscow pledged
to double its economic assistance during the following five years. Currently,
Soviet aid is US$1.5-$2 billion annually. This Soviet generosity-in-return-
for-bases has yielded multiple benefits for Vietnam as well; the magnitude of
Soviet assistance has kept Vietnam's failed economy from collapsing
altogether, while permitting Vietnam to continue both occupying
Kampuchea, and countering Chinese military pressure through deployment
of 700,000 Vietnamese troops along the China border.
In sum, there has been enormous Soviet military buildup in the Asia-
Pacific region from 1965 to the present. While Soviet military capability
was initially based on its status as a major land-power, the last dozen years
have witnessed the deployment of modem, sophisticated and ever-increasing
Soviet naval and air forces. In turn, to mitigate disadvantages associated
with their unenviable northern bases, the Soviets have solidified an enduring
(if costly) alliance with Vietnam. Coupled with improving relations with
North Korea, the Soviet Union has thus dramatically advanced its military
reach through the length and breadth of the region: indeed the Soviet fleet is
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now capable of projecting power along the entire arc of Asia from the Sea of
Japan to India.
Careful observers21 have noted, however, that the Soviet Union's
strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region is not unassailable. Much of the
Soviet Pacific Fleet is still in Northeast Asia and is thus vulnerable to
blocking by Japan despite the base at Cam Ranh Bay if the Japanese
government either permits the United States to undertake appropriate
operations from Japanese territory or Japan increases its own defense
capabilities to share this defense burden. Similarly, a modernized Chinese
military (//available) would post severe difficulties for Soviet assets east of
the Urals //"China was part of a tacit alliance against the Soviet Union which,
in turn, may itself depend on Chinese calculations of Soviet capabilities to
win a war.
Within Southeast Asia, the Soviet leapfrog to Cam Ranh Bay certainly
permits Soviet combat operations in the South China Sea either against local
actors or as part of the initial stages of general war. It also carries the
potential for using Vietnam as a staging area against U.S. Pacific forces if
the base defenses are further strengthened by upgrading the missile sites,
improving the early-warning and command and control system and replacing
the Badgers with Backfire bombers. Currently, given both the global reach
of the U.S. Navy and the nascent defenses of Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam is less
21
• See for example, Sheldon W. Simon, "The Great Powers' Security Role in
Southeast Asia: Diplomacy and Force," in Young Whan Kihl and Lawrence E. Grinter,
eds., Asian-Pacific Security: Emerging Challenges and Responses (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1986) p. 92; Gray, "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific"; and, Bernstein, "The
Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay."
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useful to the Soviets in a confrontation with the United States than it is for
achieving Soviet objectives against regional actors.
II. Soviet Objectives in Southeast Asia
In Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, the Soviet Union sees its expanding
military power as a key means of accomplishing a mix of global and regional
political, ideological, economic as well as military, objectives.
First, in terms of global interests, the Soviet military buildup in Asia,
and more generally Soviet militarization of its Asian friends and allies,22 are
viewed as critical means by which Moscow can entrench Soviet claims to
superpower status. Achieving superpower status, and thereby receiving any
associated benefits, must be both earned and maintained by continuing new
investments. Since other traditional avenues are not available in Moscow,
viz, economic prowess and an appealing political system, the Soviet Union
relies mainly on a single tool for global prominence—its military hardware.23
It is worth emphasizing that at the time the United States was withdrawing as
a land-power in Asia and becoming essentially a maritime power, the Soviet
Union was simultaneously allocating significant resources to enhancing its
burgeoning Pacific Fleet, building onto its already superior land capability.
However, the Soviets still remain largely unsuccessful in translating
military might into other useful currencies. One noted observer has
suggested seven regional developments in the early 1980s which have
22
- David Winterford, "Security, Sovereignty and Economics: Armaments
Limitation in Asia" Pacific Focus, Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring 1987), pp. 135-164.
23
• Simon "The Great Powers' Security Role in Southeast Asia" p. 90.
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prevented the Soviets from gaining political influence commensurate with
Soviet military assets: (i) the new cold war between the communist states;
(ii) China's dramatic turn to the West; (iii) the gradual reassertion of Japan;
(iv) the end of the period of U.S. drift; (v) the development of ASEAN;
(vi) the Korean standoff; and, (vii) the dynamic economic growth in the
region which could lead eventually to a new Asia-Pacific trading
community.24
Indeed, another prominent analyst has argued that "the Soviet role in
Southeast Asia is treated with considerable hostility by ASEAN"25 since
Soviet actions: (i) obstruct the realization of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality; (ii) probably accelerated the development of security cooperation
between ASEAN and outsiders, and; (iii) stimulated China's efforts to
subvert the Soviet presence in the area.26
Soviet willingness to accept negative relations with ASEAN as a cost
of "entanglement" with Vietnam,27 indicates the substantial regional pay-off
provided by the naval and air complex at Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam's
willingness to grant basing rights to the Soviets:
- permits the Soviet Union to break out of its geographic and strategic
encirclement in Northeast Asia,
24
- Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982), p. 13, cited by Young Whan Kihl and Lawrence E. Grinter,
"New Security Realities in the Asian Pacific: Perspectives, Purpose and Approach," in
Kihl and Grinter, eds., Asian-Pacific Security, p. 1 1
.
25
• Simon, "The Great Powers' Security Role in Southeast Asia," p. 94.
26
- Simon, "The Great Powers' Security Role in Southeast Asia," p. 95.
11
• Simon, "The Great Powers' Security Role in Southeast Asia," p. 90.
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- enables the Soviets to flank Japan's energy corridor through the
Indonesian Islands;
- augments the sustainability of Soviet naval developments in the Indian
Ocean;
- provides a possible counterbalance to U.S. bases in the Philippines;
- extends Soviet power-projection towards Australia;
- raises Chinese perceptions of vulnerability;
- counters any future Chinese submarine threat in the area;
- provides a Soviet forward deployment base useful in regional conflicts
involving actors like China, Vietnam and ASEAN; and
- complicates U.S. naval planning in the region during crises (or possibly a
general war). 28
Second, the apparent Soviet interest in invigorating a sluggish
domestic economy is reflected in recent Soviet economic initiatives in the
region. Developing Soviet Far Eastern and Maritime regions, for example,
mandates access to the technological and financial dynamism of the Asia-
Pacific region.29 In turn, the interest of regional actors in economic
rapprochement with the Soviet Union is reflected in the major trade
agreement signed by China and the Soviet Union in 1985 and in the lifting of
Japanese economic sanctions against the Soviet Union in November 1985.
Recent Soviet actions in the South Pacific, with the Soviets to some extent
seizing opportunities for political and economic gain arising from America's
tuna wars and general indifference in the area, give further concrete
281 Gray, "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific"; and, Bernstein, "The Soviets in Cam
Ranh Bay."
29
• The attractiveness for Japan of trading Japanese investment for Soviet raw
materials has possibly faded. Japan has been meeting its energy needs without Siberian
fuel and the Japanese economy has generally passed beyond the stage of processing raw
materials.
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expression to Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok speech. Also noteworthy is the
fact that in November 1986 the Soviet Union was, for the first time, an
observer at meetings of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference
(PECC). It has been reported that the Soviets would like to become a full
member of PECC.30 Similarly, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's
somewhat unusual tour of Southeast Asia in March 1987 31 was meant to
signal new Soviet interest in trade with the area as well as to project Soviet
"Asian-power" status while simultaneously fuelling the competition between
the Soviet Union and China for friends in ASEAN.
III. Regional Reaction to the Soviet Military Presence in Southeast Asia
It is well-known that ASEAN remains split on the nature of the threat
from the Soviet Union and its client in Southeast Asia. For example, both
Indonesia and Malaysia have long feared potential Chinese regional
dominance far more than Soviet or Soviet-Vietnamese intentions. For them,
China seems the longer-term threat while the Soviet Union may appear as a
passing, transitory danger. Chinese officials have become more alert and
sensitive to these regional fears. Indeed during his tour of the region in
October 1986, Chinese Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun sought to reassure Malaysia
that China is not interested in encouraging political dissent among
Malaysia's Chinese population. Meanwhile, Indonesia has begun to adopt a
somewhat more relaxed attitude toward China with both countries having
30
- Michael Richardson, "Soviets' Bid for Friends in Southeast-Asia," Pacific
Defense Reporter July 1986, p. 14.
31
• An unexpected twist to the Shevardnadze trip was the Soviets' apparent intention
to use India as a broker in the PRC/ASEAN-Vietnam standoff over Kampuchea.
Christian Science Monitor, March 3, 1987.
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now initiated tentative direct trade. Whether these actions signal a
fundamental change is still unclear. Indonesia has been outspoken in its
position that a secure Vietnam is a necessary counterweight to China's
regional ambitions. Indeed, Indonesian fears that prolongation of the
Kampuchean conflict will compel ever closer Sino-Thai relations (thus
drawing China further and further into Southeast Asian affairs) gain in
credibility as the conflict persists. Nevertheless, Indonesian objections have
been muted by the recognition that Thailand is now the front-line state with
Vietnam.
Core disagreements have also surfaced over whether the increasing
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia poses a military threat to ASEAN. In an
unambiguous statement, Indonesia has said that the Soviet military buildup
is "no threat to us" and comments made by the Indonesian Foreign Minister
during President Reagan's visit to Bali underscored the increasing reluctance
of Indonesia to be associated with an anti-Soviet posture.32 Malaysia also
seems skeptical about the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad has stated that "the Soviet bogey seems
overplayed" and that Soviet naval deployments in the Pacific are "natural"
and intended to balance those of the U.S.. The Prime Minister has, however,
cautioned against becoming complacent about Soviet military power in the
region. 33
Singapore and Thailand, on the other hand, both regard the Soviet
Union and Vietnam as the main threats to regional stability. Prime Minister
32
- Richardson, "Soviets' Bid for Friends in South-East Asia," p. 14.
33
- Richardson, "Soviets' Bid for Friends," p. 14.
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Lee Kuan Yew dismissed suggestions that Gorbachev's Asia policies
represented a significantly new departure. Instead, Prime Minister Lee
argued that Moscow's goal in the Pacific remained unchanged, a goal which
he characterized as exercising influence "to the maximum that they believe
their built-up strength entitles them to."34
Opinion within ASEAN seems more united on Moscow's ability to
alter Vietnam's aggressive policies in the region. However, the considerable
advantages the Soviets derive from bases in Vietnam give Hanoi a notable
bargaining chip in retaining the flow of critical Soviet military and economic
aid. For Vietnam, the Soviet connection provides both necessary war-
making resources and strengthened protection against possible Chinese naval
and air deployments in the South China Sea.35 While this does provide
Moscow with some leverage-especially over Vietnam's disastrous domestic
economic policies—it is neatly balanced by Soviet fears that coercing
Vietnam over Kampuchea may well entail losing Cam Ranh Bay. The
consequent inability to deploy Soviet submarines continuously in the South
China Sea and, at some future date, to replace the Badgers with Backfire
bombers, may seem a heavy cost to Moscow's global strategic planners.
Applying pressure sufficient to compel Vietnamese withdrawal might also
undermine Soviet credibility among its friends and allies elsewhere who are
undertaking similarly provocative and antagonistic actions.
In this respect, it is worth noting that in a top-level policy declaration
delivered to the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in
34
- Richardson, "Soviets' Bid for Friends," p. 12.
35
- See below, pp. 23-25.
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December 1986—well after Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech—Yegor
Ligachov stated that Moscow wanted to develop relations with China "on a
principled basis, without damage to the interests of other countries.'136 The
Soviet Union may well have been implying that Moscow would set limits to
its evident desire for political accommodation with China—or ASEAN for
that matter—the most notable limit being threats to its alliance with Vietnam.
While ASEAN governments continue their assessment of the degree
to which Moscow's military buildup is threatening regional stability, China
has, in the past, unambiguously warned of national, regional and global
dangers arising from the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. Seeing the threat
posed by Soviet bases in Vietnam, China has observed that: "By moving
northeast [Soviet naval and air] units can blockade China by sea and launch
a joint converging attack on the country, with Soviet ground forces stationed
along the Sino-Soviet border moving down from the north."37
Since China has based its security policy partly on a strong NATO in
the west and a U.S. presence in the Pacific, the PRC in understandably
concerned about the growth of the Soviet navy. A Soviet capacity to deny
the seas to the U.S. would post significant dangers for NATO and for U.S.
alliances in the Pacific. As the Chinese once pointed out:
Washington used to possess an obvious naval superiority, but the
Soviet Navy has since grown steadily through modernization, and is
36
- Anon., "Moscow's Dilemma: How to Eat its Cake and Have it, too," Pacific
Defense Reporter, March 1987, p. 9.
37'• Beijing, Shiejie Zhishi, March 16, 1985 in FBIS China (March 26, 1985), c. 1
cited in Kenneth G. Weiss, "Dragon at Sea: China's Navy in Strategy and Diplomacy,"
in James L. George ed., The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The Viewfrom the
Mid-1980s (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 390.
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now able to contend with Washington all around the world. The
Soviet Union can now strike North America. The superpowers'
rivalry over the seas will intensify with time because the sea not only
constitutes an economic lifeline for the West, but serves as a vital
route for troops and supplies in wartime.38
The Chinese have also seen the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay in
global terms:
In the event of war, Soviet naval and air units stationed in Cam Ranh
Bay can set off eastward and, in cooperation with the Soviet forces
stationed in bases at home, launch a two-pronged attack from the
southern and northern flanks against the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the
U.S. military installations in the Western Pacific. By moving
southward, the Soviet units in Cam Ranh Bay can promptly seize the
Strait of Malacca, the strategic passage linking the Pacific and the
Indian Ocean, and thus cut off the oil supply line to Japan, as well as
the link between the U.S. fleets deployed in the two oceans. By
moving northward, these units can blockade China by sea and launch
a joint converging attack on the country, with the Soviet ground forces
stationed along the Sino-Soviet border moving down from the north.
And, finally, by moving westward, the Soviet units from Cam Ranh
Bay can enter the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region, join forces with
the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, and surround Europe from its flank....
This has not only strengthened [the Soviet] strategic posture in the
Asian-Pacific region but is also of great significance to [the Soviet]
global strategic deployment.39
Nevertheless, the Chinese have faith in the U.S. Navy's capability to
deal with the Soviets. Indeed, some Chinese observers have cautioned
against overestimating the potential of the Soviet threat from its bases in
Vietnam. In a statement which is only partially comforting, one Chinese
analyst had this comment:
38
- Beijing, Beijing Review, April 23, 1984, in FBIS China (May 2, 1984) A6-7
cited in Weiss, "Dragon at Sea," p. 396.
39
- Beijing, Shiejie Zhishi, March 16, 1985, in FBIS China (May 2, 1985) A6-7
cited in Weiss, "Dragon at Sea," p. 396.
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Some of the strategists overestimate the potential of the Soviet threat
with its forward bases in Vietnam.... With American bases in the
Philippines in the east, Indonesian Natuna Island base in the south,
and the Chinese Southern Fleet in the north, the sphere of actions for
the Soviet naval-air detachment in Vietnam would be limited in the
South China Sea.40
As a result of these concerns China's defense planners have been
countering the Soviets in Vietnam and striving to improve China's navy both
in terms of quality and in the number of ships. While a detailed assessment
of China's naval capability41—or for that matter, the naval capability of the
ASEAN states—lies beyond the scope of this paper, the data in Table 3
indicate that China's navy is not a negligible force. From the mid-1970s the
number of Chinese ships increased dramatically. China accelerated
production of larger surface warships and introduced a new class of frigates.
The PRC also began producing new ocean auxiliary and underway-
replenishment oilers-ships necessary for extended operations. Moreover,
China's naval planners have put more emphasis on the development of
nuclear submarines such as the Han-class SSN and Xia-class SSBN. As
well, the PRC has apparently tested successfully a submarine-launched
ballistic missile in their Golf-class submarine. As a result, China's
conventional submarine fleet increased from some 35 to over 100 units.
Although most of these submarines are older Romeos and Whiskeys, they
are evidently well-suited to operations along the China coast. As the table
indicates, the Navy also has over 860 land-based aircraft.
40
- Hua Di, "The Soviet Threat to the Northern Pacific Region from an Overall Point
of View," unpublished paper, cited in Weiss, "Dragon at Sea," p. 397.
41
• See Weiss, "Dragon at Sea."
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The naval order-of-battle presented in Table 3 indicates that China's
navy is more than a coastal defense force—one analyst has referred to it as a
"contiguous seas" force. However, major deficiencies exist in
China 'sdestroyers and frigates in terms of modern sensors and weapons,
electronic warfare or electronic counter measures. The Naval Air Force is
also composed largely of obsolete aircraft. Among its deficiencies, the air
force lacks sophisticated airborne sensors and seaborne helicopters, making
it difficult to detect Soviet submarines. The Navy's air defense is
handicapped by a lack of all-weather fighters, air-to-air missiles, and
airborne- and shipborne-controlled intercept-radars. Chinese aircraft also
lack an aerial refueling capability so their combat system is limited to 150
nautical miles offshore.
The current direction of China's naval modernization and somewhat
parallel beliefs among Chinese and American naval strategists concerning
naval security threats in the Asia-Pacific region, underscore the nascent and
limited naval relationship between the U.S. and the PRC. This relationship
must be seen, however, within the context of America's longer association
with other nations in Southeast Asia. To the extent that ASEAN sees the
growth of Soviet naval and air-power at Cam Ranh Bay as a threat to
regional security, then those states may also "increase their own informal
defense cooperation and assist the U.S. Seventh Fleet patrols...."42 Such
cooperation may become "necessary for the maintenance of a loosely spread
Asia-Pacific security net."43
42
- Simon, "Cross Regional Security Collaboration in Asia: A Balance Sheet,"
Pacific Focus, Vol U, No. 1 (Spring 1987), p. 63.
43
- Simon, "Cross Regional Security Collaboration in Asia," p. 65.
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IV. Conclusion
The U.S. Maritime Strategy is designed to address conflicts ranging
from localized crisis-response to a general war. Since the core of the
strategy is maintaining deterrence in an era of possible nuclear stalemate, the
key goal of the peacetime component of the strategy is to further
international stability through support of regional balances of power. It
assumes a degree of collective or cooperative security arrangements with
friends, allies and sometimes, with neutrals. Indeed, without that
cooperation, U.S. actions in defense of its own regional interests and those of
others would be constrained, particularly in the context of limited war.
Here, the buildup of Soviet naval forces in the Pacific is a stark
measure of emerging regional imbalances. Until the Soviet Union
consolidates its geo-strategic leapfrog to Vietnam, it is this regional power-
projection capability, not necessarily the Soviet Pacific Fleet's war-making
capability against the United States, that is of most concern. This regional
power-projection entails a range of actions including using the Soviet Navy
to maintain presence, conduct surveillance, threaten the use of force, conduct
naval gunfire or air strikes, establish a blockade, encircle adversaries, and
prevent the intervention of other forces. It is the very flexibility provided by
the calibrated quality of naval forces—intrusive or out-of-sight, threatening
or non-threatening, easily dispatched or easily withdrawn—that makes them
such a potent political as well as military weapon for the Soviets in the
region.
To some degree, shared views on the Soviet global threat and Soviet-
Vietnamese regional threats have put China and the United States on a
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parallel path. It is felt that Sino-U.S. cooperation in modernizing China's
naval force will complicate Moscow's calculation of the "correlation of
force" while sending a signal to Vietnam of continued resistance to its
aggressive action. However, despite some overlapping views, U.S. defense
planners have recently been cautioned not to "assume Chinese co-
belligerency in functional, tacit alliance."44
Indeed, the U.S. remains concerned about adverse, or at least
unsettled, reaction in ASEAN arising from Sino-U.S. military ties. One
issue raised within ASEAN is that a U.S. naval relationship with China
might upset the naval balance in the region without significantly improving
Chinese capabilities against the Soviets. However, "if the U.S. and Soviet
Union are subtracted from the equation, there is no naval balance; rather
there is an imbalance that strongly favors the PRC.45 Thus U.S. assistance
for China's navy "must help China against the Soviet threat-since these
capabilities are already so great against the other regional states."46
Several constraints mitigate an evolving Sino-U.S. relationship and
thus may defuse some ASEAN concerns:
- Chinese fears of becoming too dependent on the U.S. for arms;
- China's reluctance to provoke the Soviet Union unduly by establishing
close military ties with the U.S.;
- China's recognition of ASEAN concerns;
44
• Gray, "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific," p. 13.
45
- Weiss, "Dragon at Sea," p. 400.
46
- Weiss, "Dragon at Sea," p. 400.
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- the limitation on the amount of foreign exchange China has available for
modernization of the military;
- U.S. reluctance to move further than regional opinion permits; and,
- U.S. uncertainty about the future direction of China's foreign policy.
While there are conflicting views on the nature of the threat posed by
Soviet naval power in the region, it is most likely that Moscow has built up
its military strength in order to compel regional governments to
accommodate Soviet foreign policy goals; to renew concern within the
region about the wisdom of close association with the United States; and, to
aggravate U.S. resource constraints in meeting Moscow's regional and
global militarization.
Although all ASEAN nations are maritime states and therefore
vulnerable to threats of a potential Soviet naval blockade or worse, U.S.
defense planners must exercise caution before assuming that regional actors
share Washington's abiding concern with Soviet intentions. Both divisions
within ASEAN and dilemmas in Sino-U.S. military relations mandate that
Washington first work to enhance security perceptions on the basis of the
mosaic of ties interlinking the Asia-Pacific area. Specifically, U.S. policy-
makers need to address regional issues through increasingly sensitive
diplomacy, maintaining an open trading system and using balanced and
gradual military enhancement. While the U.S. needs to make absolutely
clear America's determination to resist the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia,
appeals for regional security cooperation should be based on an
unambiguous prior commitment by the U.S. to the regional goals of growth
and development of diversified economies. To meet these regional goals,
enhanced naval cooperation between the U.S. and ASEAN might well be a
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judicious commitment of resources on both sides in order to provide the
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